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Abstract
In this paper we show that domestic economic and political characteristics can explain why
some countries established a Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) and others not. We find that
1) the existence of natural resources profits, 2) the government structure and 3) the ability
to invest in a socially beneficial way in the domestic economy can explain this choice. At
the same time these same factors do not relate to the size of the national savings. We use
a sample of countries that established a SWF in the period 1998-2008 and compare them
to those that did not set up a fund in the same period. The results suggest that SWFs
tend to be established in autocratically run countries that have difficulties finding suitable
opportunities for domestic investments.
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1. Introduction
The aggregate size of assets under management of sovereign wealth funds (SWF) has
been stable over the period 2014-2016 at around US$ 7.4 trillion, with no new establish-
ments of any (major) SWF over the last 5 years. With the maturing of these new major
financial vehicles, the time has come to consider carefully what have been the political
and economic forces contributing to the blossoming of SWFs over the last decades. Better
understanding of what gave rise to SWFs’ emergence is the roadmap of this paper and
should incidentally shed some light on their potential long run developments.
Since SWFs have proven to be persistent government bodies (we are not aware of any
SWF that disbanded in recent times), it is relevant to understand what factors determined
their establishments. However, SWFs vary greatly in terms of asset under management,
structure, management and objectives. This is not very surprising. Each country has its
own internal processes that give rise to policy outcomes, such as the decision to establish a
SWF (Orihuela, 2013; Yi-Chong and Bahgat, 2010). We aim to capture the broad strokes
in history that can explain why 16 countries established a SWF in the period 1998-2008
and many others did not.
A number of articles have been written in normative fashion on the optimal savings
decisions for countries rich in non-renewable natural resources. Economic theory advises
that one should save temporary income to finance long-term investments that reap per-
manently higher consumption. This principle is quite strong even while one can account for
various country and market specific aspects such as capital scarcity, domestic investment
absorptive capacity, political heterogeneity and the volatility of resource revenue. We aim
to provide evidence that these ‘optimal’ policies appear to have driven the establishments
of SWFs. In this way, this article is one of the few that provides an empirical analysis on
this issue (for an exception see van den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2016).
This article tests whether the surge of SWF establishments was determined by the
government structure and the ability to invest profitably in the domestic economy, while
conditioning on the availability of resource rents. Income from exhaustible natural re-
sources are a pre-condition for many, but not all, SWFs, because their exploitation offers
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substantial and multi-year funding.2 Based only on this criteria, one could expect to ob-
serve many more natural resource-rich countries with a SWF. However, many did not
establish one.
We use the sudden emergence of new SWFs to test for the role of economic and polit-
ical factors in their establishments using logistic regressions. We argue that the sudden
emergence of SWFs in recent times was triggered by a commodities price boom that was
outside of the control of individual countries. As the control group, we use all the countries
that have not set up a SWF. The empirical identification relies on strict time-separability
where past determinants relate to future establishments.
We find that resource rents are a strong predictor for the establishment of a SWF.
However, these rents become less important once we control for a government’s scale of
accountability and executive constraint summarised in a single measure of autocracy. Past
expenditures on public goods, such as on education, predict a lower probability of estab-
lishing a SWF in the future. We interpret this as an indication that on average countries
have made a trade-off between domestic and foreign investments. We find that resource
rents are a special case as the more general current account turns out to be a statistically
insignificant regressor. Similarly, the variables that are robustly related to the probability
of establishing a SWF are not similarly related to the countries foreign asset position. The
decision to establish a SWF can, therefore, be interpreted as a policy instrument, but does
not necessarily correspond directly to actual savings.
Establishing a special purpose fund designed to manage foreign investments, with trans-
parent rules and objectives, is generally considered good policy once a country has eval-
uated its options between domestic investment and foreign savings (Mohn, 2016; Torvik,
2016). However, in our data a SWF is more likely to be established by an autocratic gov-
ernment than by a democratic one. Does this indicate that benevolent single rulers have
been better in implementing sensible policies than democracies? This may not necessarily
be the case once we look at the qualitative characteristics of SWFs. Using measures on
the transparency of funds and their investment accountability we find a wide variation.
2In the remainder of the text we will use the terms of natural resources, resources and commodities
interchangeably.
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Additionally, a number of the SWFs that were established during our sample period have
a particularly small asset base relative to the potential windfall to the country. This can
indicate that these funds may be set up primarily for political reasons rather than for
genuine implementation of an optimal saving policy for future generations.
In fact, the surge of SWF establishments in autocratic countries with little experience of
market-based investments gave rise to discussion on the potentially international political
reasons behind these investments (Johnson, 2007; Kirshner, 2009; Monk, 2009). This in
turn motivated some stakeholders to call for a regime of ‘best practices’ that could ensure
that government-controlled funds invest for economic and financial reasons in transparent
ways. Truman (2008) provided a first set of institutional characteristics, while the SWF
Institute produces quarterly a similar rating (Linaburg and Maduell, 2014). The effect of
such funds on the financial markets is in turn analysed by others (Beck and Fidora, 2008;
Sun and Hesse, 2009; Kotter and Lel, 2011; In et al., 2013; Gomes, 2008; Bernstein et al.,
2013; Ang, 2012). Neither those looking at the political characteristics of SWFs nor those
looking at the financial characteristics of SWFs often take the domestic financial position
(from the perspective of the SWF) into account. Those that do, find that domestic politics
plays a great role in the final decision of setting up a SWF (Orihuela, 2013; Yi-Chong and
Bahgat, 2010).3
To our knowledge, no academic contribution on SWFs specifically addresses the ques-
tion of the emergence of SWFs and of the determinants leading countries to decide to set up
such funds. The only notable exception is the paper of Aizenman and Glick (2009) which
studies the determinants of the existence in 2007 or 2008 of SWFs. They find that current
account surpluses, fuel exports and foreign exchange reserves are significant in explaining
the existence of a SWF. They also explore the role of government indicators (proxied by
the Worldwide Governance Indicators of Kaufmann et al., 2009). Our article differs to
theirs by using an alternative econometric setup, and a dataset with which we are able to
draw stronger causal relationships between economic-political country characteristics and
3See also the fund profiles given by http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/
natural-resource-funds/, created in cooperation with the National Resource Governance Insti-
tute.
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Figure 1: Establishment of SWFs: the 1998-2008 wave
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Note: The data range represent the period from which we draw the independent
variables. All SWFs established between 1998 and 2008 are to be explained with
this data.
the establishments of SWFs. We also relate directly to theoretical literature on resource
wealth management, and test various predictions suggested in this literature discussed in
the next section.
2. Data, Hypotheses and Methodology
The aim of this research is to understand why some countries have a SWF and others
have not. Since some countries established a SWF and others did not, we have a classic
binary setup that can be approached by a logit regression. We exploit the 1998-2008
window, when 16 countries established a SWF, to explore the role of a range of potential
determinants before this period, taking data from 1997 or the average over several years
ending in 1997.4
Information on the years of establishment of the SWFs and on the fund management
characteristics were collected from Truman (2008).5 Since we look at the country level,
4We estimated the models using several window lengths of the past, without much qualitative differ-
ences. These results are available on request.
5And completed by information collected on the website of the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, as of
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where necessary, we summarise the data over the different national SWFs. For instance,
for the establishment data we take the earliest year available, for total assets we take the
sum over all the funds. As reported in Table 1, 16 countries set up their first SWF between
1998 and 2008. The largest, whose assets exceed US$100 billion at the end of 2016, are
those of China, Qatar, Kazakhstan and Russia. It is striking to note that this ’98-’08
wave was relatively global, with 1 European, 4 African, 6 Asian and 5 North and South
American countries.6
Figure 1 plots the number of Sovereign Wealth Funds over time as well as the commodity
price index. In 1970 there were eight SWFs. From the 1970s through the 1990s SWFs were
established sporadically. We observe a sharp rise in the frequency of SWFs establishments
by the end of the 1990s throughout the 2000s. This pattern coincides with a sharp rise in
the price level of many commodities, including oil, metals and agricultural products. The
vertical shaded area depicts the time frame from which we draw our independent variables
to explain reasons behind the establishment of SWFs during 1998-2008. There was a sharp
drop in commodity prices around 2008 which again appears to coincide with a sudden
stop in new establishments. For this reason, we argue that the sudden emergence of many
SWFs was triggered to a great extent by a commodity price boom, which we believe to
be exogenous to individual countries. In turn, with the combination of data largely from
before the boom, we identify the relevant variables, without necessarily having to control
for unobserved heterogeneity.
Since our study focuses on the emergence of SWFs over the 1998-2008 period, we do
not include in our study funds established before 1998. This is on the one hand to establish
causation, as the regressors we use are obtained for 1997 or earlier. On the other hand,
our discussion on SWFs relates to the emergence of newly established funds, rather than
those that have existed for a long time. Nevertheless, results generally continue to hold
with the inclusion of older funds. Additionally, we can reflect how our findings correspond
from past experiences of funds established prior to our sample period.7
December 2016.
6Table A-1 in the Appendix lists the main SWF, with their respective total assets and years of estab-
lishment.
7For this reason some large SWFs are excluded from our sample, notably the Norwegia SWF (estab-
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Table 1: Countries with first SWF established in the 1998-2008 wave.
Country Year Assets Name
Algeria 2000 50 Revenue Regulation Fund
Azerbaijan 1999 37.3 State Oil Fund
Bahrein 2006 10.6 Mumtalakat Holding Company
Chile 2006 23.1 Social and Economic Stabilization Fund (15.2); Pension
Reserve Fund (7.9)
China 2000 1049.8 China Investment Corporation (813.8); National Social
Security Fund (236)
Gabon 1998 0.4 Gabon Sovereign Wealth Fund
Iran 2000 62 Oil Stabilization Fund
Kazakhstan 2000 148.3 Samruk-Kazyna JSC (69.3); Kazakhstan National Fund
(77); National Investment Corporation (2)
South Korea 2005 91.8 Korea Investment Corporation
Mexico 2000 6 Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund of Mexico
Nigeria 2003 1 Excess Crude Account
Peru 1999 9.2 Fiscal stabilization Fund
Russia 2008 152.2 National Welfare Fund (73.5), Reserve Fund (65.7), Rus-
sian Direct Investment Fund (13)
Sudan 2002 . Oil Revenue Stabilization Account
Trinidad and Tobago 2007 5.5 Heritage and Stabilization Fund
Venezuela 1998 0.8 National Development Fund; Macroeconomic Stabiliza-
tion Fund
Note: The column “Year” refers to the date of establishment of the SWFs. The list is largely based
on Truman (2008), excluding funds which have pension assets with a weight superior to 50% of
the total country funds. The column “Assets” reports (cumulated) assets size in billion US$ as of
Sept. 2016 (collected in December 2016 on SWF Institute website). Where we have information
on multiple funds, we indicated the size in billion US$ in 2016 in brackets. We do not consider the
date of establishment of the SAFE for China as reference date for the country, since it mostly acted
a passive manager of foreign exchange reserves until 2000. Same justification for SAMA in Saudi
Arabia. Further information, including of other SWFs is given in Appendix AppendixA.
Having identified the period of analysis, the next question is to identify the variables
of interest which could explain why countries chose to set up a SWF. We expect that
both the domestic political characteristics of a country, and its economic situation will
affect the governments decision to set up a SWF, how much to put in the fund, and for
which purposes it may be used. We structure these political and economic factors in one
condition and four hypotheses. These hypotheses relate to a number of theoretical papers
on resource wealth management and focus on various economic and political factors. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to develop a theoretical model that could incorporate all of
these economic and institutional aspects in one unifying framework.
lished in 1990), The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority SWF (established in 1976), the Kuwait Investment
Authority (established in 1953), the Hong-Kong Monetary Authority (established in 1993), The Gov-
ernment of Singapore Investment Corporation (established in 1981) and Temasek Holdings of Singapore
(established in 1974).
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C1: Resource rents increase the probability of observing a SWF.
Having the economic means is a precondition to the ability to save. Since we include
all countries of the world for which we have data, this condition serves to make a selection
of resource-rich and resource-poor countries.8 The World Bank provides data on resource
rents (oil, gas, metals, phosphates measured in percentage of GDP) as a measure of govern-
ment revenue from natural resources. Alternatively, we use a measure of resource exports
to capture the importance of natural resources for foreign exchange earnings. We also
include GDP per capita as a general measure of income level.
H1: Domestic investment substitutes for foreign investments.
Given the resources, a country can decide to spend or invest, while investments in turn
may be targeted towards domestic public capital or foreign assets. A SWF is mostly asso-
ciated with the latter although there are exceptions. Domestic public capital investment
is typically conducted directly through government ministries of infrastructure, education
and science while government spending is conducted through any public body. There-
fore, we expect the probability of SWF to decrease the higher a government’s spending
on domestic investments, in particular items such as education and infrastructure. The
reason that a government might not chose to invest domestically for long-term growth may
be related to its limited absorptive capacity relative to the scale of the resource revenues
(van der Ploeg and Venables, 2013; van der Ploeg, 2012). In this case, the optimal policy
would be to ‘park’ the funds for a little while in an investment fund and using only some
of the resource revenues to steadily build-up the absorptive capacity of the country.
We look at three variables that may proxy for this factor of domestic investments:
a measure of education spending, a measure of general government expenditures, both
expressed in % of GDP, and a non-financial measure of infrastructure development.9
8Pre-selecting the sample to include only those with some resource rents does not affect the results
materially. Moreover, there is a priori no reason why a country without natural resources would not be
able to establish a SWF, indeed we observe a few SWF establishments that fit this case.
9The interaction between investment in education and natural resource wealth is addressed by Gylfason
(2001) and Gylfason and Zoega (2006). Health expenditures could also be regarded as a form of domestic
investments, and may be affected by natural resources windfalls, although Acemoglu et al. (2013) found
no such effect in local US data. One complication with using actual health expenditure data is that the
correlation between public healthcare spending and health outcomes may not be very strong. Countries
focusing spending on sickness prevention and stimulation of healthy behaviour may on average have lower
7
The attention that has historically been given to the role of education in development
makes that international comparable data on education expenditures is now available for
most countries, as opposed to spending on other types of public capital. There exists (to
our knowledge) no such comparable data on infrastructure. Instead we use a measure of
the length of existing roads relative to the population. Government expenditures includes
domestic investments as well as government consumption and, therefore, can be expected
to capture imperfectly the mechanism of domestic investments.
H2: Government characteristics matter for the establishment of SWFs
The theoretical literature in political economy on natural resources suggest that greater
accountability of government as well as well-defined property rights are instrumental for
optimal behaviour of consumption, savings and investment in terms of national welfare
(Robinson et al., 2006; 2014; van der Ploeg, 2010).
We test this hypothesis formally by relating the measure of democracy of a country
to the likelihood of establishing a SWF, while controlling for other economic factors. We
do so by creating an indicator variable equal to 1 if the value of polity2 democracy score
is between -10 and 0 (more autocratic), and 0 if the score is above 0 (more democratic)
(Marshall et al., 2006). Many oil-exporting countries fall in the autocratic regime category,
but note that our sample is not restricted to oil and gas. To account explicitly for the
interaction of natural resource revenues and a country’s governance structure as discussed
in the before mentioned literature, we include such interaction explicitly in the empirical
model as well. We will explore in Section 4 the various mechanisms further.
H3: Debt reduction serves as an alternative to establishing a SWF.
Apart from investing in public capital, a government that has a substantial foreign
debt may choose to pay this off first before setting up a SWF. In this way, paying off
debt is similarly an investment in the public good of a sound national account. Rather
spending per capita with better average health outcomes than countries focussing spending on treatment.
Therefore we leave health care expenditures out of our analysis, while acknowledging that from a public
policy point of view healthcare spending is as important in consideration for domestic investments as
education and infrastructure.
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than the debt position, it may be that the borrowing costs that matter for the choice of
paying down the debt (van der Ploeg and Venables, 2011). However, to our knowledge
there is no comprehensive dataset available that collects government borrowing costs for
the entire world.10 We will test this hypothesis instead with measures of the debt stock,
and indirectly with the measures on the net financial asset position of the country.
H4: When resource windfalls are subject to future demand and price uncertainty more
should be saved.
A SWF can be established to cover a country from volatile resource revenues, by ex-
tracting quickly the resources under ground, and transforming the revenues to a predict-
able long-term revenue flow (van der Ploeg, 2010; van den Bremer and van der Ploeg, 2013;
Cherif and Hasanov, 2013). As measures of uncertainty we calculate the volatility of both
the natural resource revenue and a country’s GDP using up to 20 years of data.11
We define the left-hand side variable as a dummy equal to 1 if the country established a
first SWF in the 1998-2008 window and to 0 otherwise.12 The variables on the right-hand
side are the potential determinants of the emergence of SWFs, as measured at the very
beginning of the window. To mitigate a year-specific effect, we computed the determinants
as 4-year averages over 1994-1997 (similar to Aizenman and Glick, 2009).13 Table 2 presents
descriptive statistics of the main variables that we use, divided over countries that did not
set up a fund in the period of analysis versus those that did.14 We find that future SWF
countries differ significantly from non-SWF countries in the main variables that we use to
test our hypotheses, except for net foreign assets (NFA) and resource rents volatility, while
marginally for the polity indicator and resource rents.
10The ‘JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index’ goes a long way in this respect, but not all rates for
the countries included are measured in the same way, and the dataset excludes all non-emerging markets,
particularly developed countries.
11We define volatility as the standard deviation divided by the mean.
12Note that Aizenman and Glick (2009) do not define their dummy the same way. They define the
country dummy as equal to 1 if a SWF exists in 2007/2008, independently of the date of establishment.
Their focus is not precisely on the emergence of SWFs.
13Taking the average will also help to fill in some gaps of missing data, allowing to increase the sample.
This is especially relevant for models that include data on government expenditures.
14Table A-2 in the Appendix describes in more details each variable and its source.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Non-SWF countries (future) SWF countries
Variable obs mean st. dev obs mean st. dev equal
1(Polity2<0) 163 0.27 0.45 16 0.50 0.52 0.10
Resource Rents (% GDP) 163 6.00 10.52 16 11.29 11.64 0.10
Comm. Ex. (% Trade) 134 51.48 28.28 15 66.06 29.48 0.09
Log GDP/cap 163 7.90 1.44 16 8.42 0.97 0.07
Edu. Exp. (% GDP) 94 4.64 4.50 10 3.45 0.87 0.03
Road/pop 132 6.15 6.43 16 3.84 2.25 0.03
Gov. Cons (% GDP) 147 15.73 6.01 16 12.99 3.96 0.01
Curr. Acc. (% GDP) 119 −5.37 9.40 15 −1.46 7.27 0.02
Debt (% GDP) 129 75.20 58.79 15 55.21 57.65 0.07
NFA (% GDP) 131 −39.09 146.73 16 −5.66 16.66 0.22
FX res. (% GDP) 132 46.00 61.49 16 15.83 30.78 0.01
Volatility GDP 163 0.34 0.15 16 0.37 0.19 0.00
Volatility Rents 150 0.51 0.30 16 0.61 0.48 0.66
Note: The last column indicates the p-value of a t-test on equality of means. 1(Polity2<0) is an indicator
variable, Comm. Ex. is the commodity exports, Edu. Exp. is education expenditures, Road/pop is a
measure of road density over population density, Gov. Cons. is government consumption, Curr. Acc. is
current account, NFA is net financial assets, FX res. is foreign exchange reserves, Volatilities are calculated
as the standard deviation divided by the mean over 1978-1998. For more data details see Table A-2.
The benchmark estimating equation can be represented as follows
SWFi = logit(β1Rentsi + β2 log(GDPpci) + β3Non-democrati + β4GovExpi) + ui, (1)
where SWFi represents a dummy of having established a SWF in the period 1998-2008,
while the other regressors indicate past country characteristics that have preceded this
decision. We will vary the exact combination and form of the right-hand side variables.
Note that the four independent variables correspond to the Condition 1, and Hypotheses 1
and 2 defined above. We include log(GDPpci) as a general control variable for a country’s
development. For each regression we indicate the number of SWFs in the sample, the
Pseudo-R2 and the log-likelihood.
Given that we allow for the establishment of a SWF in a 10-year period, those es-
tablished earlier may have a stronger relation to economic and other variables during the
1994-1997 period than those that are established later. Additionally, there is a great hetero-
geneity between funds, whereby some funds appear to be established for symbolic reasons
only as they hold very little assets, while others rank among the biggest in the world. The
binary variable for existence is, therefore, a rather crude measure. This potential issue
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could work against our estimation method. We let the data tell if our model can explain
the establishments of SWF.
Moreover, alternative setups may have even greater drawbacks. One alternative is to
shorten the window of establishments, for instance by taking only 3 or 5 years since 1998,
giving potentially stronger results, but this would reduce the number of observed positives,
and, thus, a much narrower scope for the interpretation of the results. Alternatively, a
panel setup is possible, whereby past data relates to the setup of a fund in any time.
However, this is not appropriate for our dataset and the question we aim to answer, since
a conditional logit estimation (a method to substitute out country fixed determinants) can
only exploit information from those countries that change from having no fund to having
one somewhere during the time-span we analyse. Therefore, this estimator is unable to
compare countries that set up a fund with those that do not.15
3. Results
The baseline results of model (1) are presented in Table 3 and lead to the following
observations.
3.1. C1: Resource rents increase the probability of observing a SWF
A country’s income level, as measured by log GDP per capita, and natural resource
rents correspond positively to the probability of establishing a SWF. Unsurprisingly, as a
necessary condition, funding matters.
3.2. H1: Domestic investment substitutes for foreign investments
The level of education spending and general government consumption affects negatively
the probability of establishing a SWF. This confirms what was suggested by the theoretical
literature; a higher domestic level of investment makes future domestic investments more
profitable and thereby increases the opportunity cost of establishing a SWF. The non-
financial measure of infrastructure development indicates the same result, a higher road
15In addition, the conditional logit depends on a binary variable that is conditionally uncorrelated over
time. This is certainly violated in our dataset since countries typically do not wind down a fund but keep
it for the remainder of the foreseeable future.
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Table 3: Benchmark
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SWF SWF SWF SWF SWF SWF
Rents (%GDP) 0.033 0.200*** 0.239*** 0.220*** 0.218*** 0.222**
(0.021) (0.055) (0.089) (0.053) (0.051) (0.091)
Log GDPpc 0.659*** 1.030*** 1.313*** 1.747*** 1.437*** 0.741***
(0.163) (0.235) (0.485) (0.321) (0.297) (0.276)
Non-democrat 1.648** 3.339*** 3.021* 2.806*** 3.878*** 2.104
(0.783) (0.957) (1.787) (0.923) (1.046) (1.355)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.187*** -0.195* -0.187*** -0.206*** -0.204**
(0.058) (0.100) (0.057) (0.058) (0.102)
Edu. exp. -0.749***
(0.279)
roads / pop. -0.491***
(0.186)
Gov. cons. -0.221***
(0.073)
Gov. exp. excl. edu. -0.057
(0.047)
Constant -8.601*** -12.725*** -12.188*** -16.142*** -13.084*** -9.090***
(1.633) (2.506) (4.387) (2.684) (2.603) (2.985)
Observations 179 179 104 148 163 99
n. SWFs 16 16 10 16 16 10
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.20 0.24 0.32 0.30 0.19
ll -47.50 -42.97 -25.15 -34.29 -36.80 -26.38
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
density relative to the population is associated with a lower probability of setting up a
fund.
Conceptually we can make a distinction between government consumption and domestic
investment. In reality, it is not easy to observe the difference. For instance, expenditures
on eduction are clearly government spending that can be counted as consumption, but
equally as investments for long-term growth. In contrast, there might be plenty of govern-
ment expenditures that we should interpret as (wasteful) consumption rather than genuine
attempts for long-term growth. This may include extending the public sector for patron-
age reasons and expenditures on luxury goods for government officials. On the other hand,
money can only be spent once. Therefore, any government expenditures will decrease the
amount available for savings. The negative coefficient fits both the story of current con-
sumption and long-term investments. The question then is whether we can disentangle the
two mechanisms.
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In our dataset, there is more data available for the general government account than
the more specific educational expenditures or other parts of the government budget. In the
model, individually both relate negatively to the establishment of SWFs (models (3) and
(5)), but their coefficients differ, with past educational expenditures indicating a stronger
negative effect on the probability of setting up a SWF compared to government consump-
tion. Government expenditures include already the expenditures on education. When we
include government expenditures excluding education we find a smaller and insignificant
coefficient.
Both education and the infrastructure variable can be viewed as part of the public
domestic investment, and both indicators suggest that countries with higher expendit-
ures on these (taking the relative density of roads as a proxy for actual expenditures on
infrastructure) are the least likely to set up a fund.
This supports Hypothesis 1 indicating that SWFs may be the result of the inability or
unwillingness to invest in the domestic economy.16 In the following, we continue to include
the broader government consumption variable, since it is the most widely available variable
and captures the process of government spending and investment well.17
3.3. H2: Government characteristics matter for the establishment of SWFs
Political regime matters. Autocratic countries are more likely to establish a SWF than
democratic ones. In addition, the interaction term between the dummy for autocratic power
and natural resource rents is significant, negative and of an amplitude close to the coefficient
on the natural resource rent variable. The interpretation is that the role of natural resource
is zero for autocratic countries. In other words, the size of natural resources revenue only
matters in democratic countries. Autocratic countries tend to establish SWFs, irrespective
of actual size of the rents.18
16The availability of data cannot be assumed to be completely random in this case. Data on educational
expenditures is much scarcer. Those countries that produce such data are probably more likely to value
such figures, independent of the actual value, implying that there exist already a certain mechanism
for proper government spending. Countries with regimes that aim to hide as much as possible where
government money is spent would drop out of the sample.
17While not reported, a model with education and road/pop together indicates both individually signi-
ficant at 5% level. Education and government expenditures excluding education jointly in a model are not
significant individually at 10% level, but jointly at 1%. Results available from authors.
18Table B-4 in the Supplementary Appendix gives results for interaction of rents with the other variables.
These results indicate that the interaction with regime type is indeed the most important, and results
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Table 4: Marginal Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPM Logit
full full democrat non-democrat
Rents 1.67∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 0.37
(0.82) (0.40) (0.51) (0.40)
Log GDPpc 6.11∗∗∗ 9.20∗∗∗ 8.58∗∗∗ 10.94∗
(2.21) (3.32) (3.00) (6.19)
Edu. exp. −0.66∗ −5.25∗∗ −5.25∗∗ −6.24∗
(0.39) (2.36) (2.31) (3.57)
Average marginal effects based on Table 3 model (3).
To understand the size of effects for this first set of results we estimate average marginal
effects for model (3). Table 4 presents the results. The first column gives the result of a
linear probability model (LPM) using the same sample and model as the other columns.
Column two gives the figures for the average marginal effect over the sample using the logit.
These coefficients can be interpreted as the effect of a unit change of x on the probability
of observing a SWF, similar to the coefficients of the LPM. For instance, an increase by
1 percentage point of the resource rents-to-GDP ratio would increase the probability of
observing a SWF by 1.25%. This is a sizeable effect for those countries that experience a
significant boom. The income figure implies that rising income per capita strongly increases
the probability of observing a fund, which underlines that a fund is principally a savings
instrument. The coefficient on expenditure on education indicates that an increase by 1
percentage point of the educational expenditures-to-GDP ratio decreases the probability
of observing a SWF in the future. These two factors, income and education, underline the
opposing effects of saving due to increased income and domestic investment for the benefit
of economic development. Relative to the LPM, the estimated effects from the logit model
of rents is smaller, while that on education bigger, but the magnitude and sign are broadly
in line.
In columns (3) and (4) we compare the coefficients over democratic and non-democratic
governments. This comparison allows to show the interactive effect that this government
cannot be attributed to some general non-linearity of the rents data.
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characteristic has on all the determinants due to the non-constant marginal effects in the
logit model. The marginal effects for democratic governments are very similar to the
average marginal effects, although the effect of resource rents has slightly decreased, while
for income it has slightly increased. For non-democratic countries, however, the marginal
effects are very different. The estimates indicate that resource rents are not related to
the establishment of a fund, in line with the observation in Table 3. Apparently there are
enough countries in the sample that establish a fund while our data indicates that their
rents are only marginal in the period before.19 Income per capita still has a significant
coefficient. The effect on resource rents disappears in line with the observation in Table
3. The estimate for educational expenditures is larger compared to democratic regimes
indicating that the trade-off between public expenditures or savings is much stronger in
autocratic regimes relative to democratic countries.
3.4. H3: Debt reduction serves an an alternative to establishing a SWF
Table 5 explores the role of a complementary set of regressors (on top of our benchmark
regression (Table 3 model (5)) related to the funding of SWFs, namely the current account
balance (Curr. acc.), the stock of government debt (Debt), the net financial assets (NFA)
and the foreign exchange reserves (FX res). As different measures for economic surpluses,
we expect current account surpluses and large positive net financial assets to be positively
correlated to the probability of setting up a SWF, while debt should be negatively correlated
corresponding to Hypothesis H3.
We find in Table 5 that these additional regressors do not bring much to the bench-
mark model. They are not statistically significant at the usual levels, meaning that natural
resource rents and log GDP per capita (pc) are sufficient to capture the funding compon-
ent.20 Surprisingly, the debt stock appears to play no general role in the prediction for a
SWF.21
19This could also be because some countries were forward looking, setting up a fund before the rents
started flowing.
20Other variables were included of which results are not presented, such as household consumption as
percentage of GDP (in case there is a trade off between government and private household spending and
savings, as well as gross savings as a percentage of GDP. Neither were significant nor affected the other
variables. Excluding government consumption from the model does not change the results.
21Additional results on the role of debt are presented in the Supplementary Appendix in Table B-5,
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Table 5: Alternative regressors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SWF SWF SWF SWF SWF SWF
Rents (%GDP) 0.211*** 0.264*** 0.216*** 0.227*** 0.239*** 0.233***
(0.051) (0.071) (0.052) (0.059) (0.051) (0.052)
Log GDPpc 1.432*** 1.262*** 1.531*** 1.274*** 1.442*** 1.435***
(0.414) (0.334) (0.379) (0.333) (0.300) (0.307)
Non-democrat 3.192*** 3.497*** 3.621*** 3.454*** 3.731*** 4.151***
(1.114) (1.114) (1.024) (0.999) (1.047) (1.169)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.151** -0.233*** -0.204*** -0.215*** -0.215*** -0.224***
(0.060) (0.075) (0.059) (0.065) (0.057) (0.061)
Gov. cons. -0.244*** -0.232*** -0.240*** -0.207*** -0.209*** -0.216***
(0.093) (0.087) (0.084) (0.074) (0.067) (0.074)
Curr. acc. (% GDP) 0.051
(0.042)
Debt (% GDP) -0.012
(0.010)
NFA (% GDP) 0.001
(0.002)
FX res (% GDP) -0.013
(0.011)
Vol. Rents 1.491**
(0.689)
Vol. GDP 1.536
(2.228)
Constant -12.185*** -10.553*** -13.248*** -11.266*** -14.140*** -13.860***
(3.021) (2.748) (2.932) (2.843) (2.699) (2.772)
Observations 128 138 140 141 156 163
n. SWFs 15 15 16 16 16 16
Pseudo R2 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.30
ll -30.67 -32.93 -34.24 -33.82 -35.13 -36.53
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.5. H4: When resource windfalls are subject to future demand and price uncertainty more
should be saved
We finally include a measure for economic risk, corresponding to Hypothesis 4. We use
the 20-years volatility of rents and GDP per capita, as proxies for the future uncertainty.22
Volatility in the economy or from the resource rents creates an incentive for additional
precautionary saving. Setting up a SWF would contribute to achieving a smoother income
stream from volatile receipts. However, volatility might also give scope to abuse as changing
indicating that the effect of external debt may be sensitive to sample selection. Arezki and Bru¨ckner
(2012) found that there may be a particular heterogeneity in the responds to resource windfall on external
debts between democracies and non-democracies.
22We experimented with shorter samples, which give qualitatively similar results.
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prices and production give opportunity for back-channelling receipts to those in power.23
We find in Table 5 that volatility of rents is positively associated to the establishment
of SWFs, but not volatility of GDP.
3.6. Alternative specifications
We collect in the Supplementary Appendix alternative specifications of our main results.
We looked at the role of income inequality (Appendix AppendixB.1), alternative resource
measures (Appendix AppendixB.2), functional form specifications and sample selection
(Appendix AppendixB.3). Finally, we also conducted a duration analysis, which exploits
the time dimension of the decision to establish a SWF (Appendix AppendixB.4).
4. The meaning of SWF establishments
While our empirical model on SWF establishments is robust to the inclusion of other
explanatory variables and sample selection, what the binary indicator means by itself, and
how our model relates to differences in the characteristics of SWFs, is still to be clarified.
Therefore, we start by investigating whether we can take our indicator variable as a measure
of national savings decision. Secondly, we will investigate how the likelihood of established
SWFs reflects on their observed institutional quality. Thirdly, taking into account that
there is a political process behind the establishment we look into various channels that
underlie our autocracy variable, in particular whether measures of legal constraints on the
executives and protection of property rights relate to the establishment of SWFs.
4.1. Do our independent variables predict public savings?
As SWFs are principally mechanisms to save and manage natural resource proceeds,
our model might be expected to work equally well to predict savings. If country-wide
savings decision are taken based on the determinants we found before, then the same
variables should have explanatory power in a regression model with variables that measure
countries’ savings as the dependent variables. We use the average net foreign assets and
foreign exchange reserves as percentages of GDP over 2006-2008 as such indicators. Since
23Ideally, we may wish to use more recent measures of volatility or even of expected volatility as a better
measure for uncertainty. As of yet we have no such measures available. In contrast, 20 years past data
should give a very conservative estimate for this uncertainty measure. We found no effect for the standard
deviation of rents instead of the volatility measure.
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Table 6: Public savings as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FX res (% GDP) FX res (% GDP) NFA (% GDP) NFA (% GDP)
Rents (%GDP) 0.900 2.271 -0.715 -2.702
(2.102) (2.585) (1.977) (2.108)
Log GDPpc -14.643** -11.815** 7.071 6.071
(5.959) (4.977) (8.209) (11.570)
Non-democrat -0.532 2.766 21.016 5.486
(24.224) (21.112) (23.810) (20.134)
Non-democrat × Rents -1.523 -2.479 0.890 2.860
(2.137) (2.881) (1.961) (2.367)
Gov. cons. 0.747 -2.888
(0.684) (2.959)
Curr. acc. (% GDP) 0.195 -0.180
(0.671) (0.690)
Constant 156.399*** 111.720** -86.292 -21.755
(57.602) (48.300) (71.905) (67.637)
Observations 150 125 150 125
R2 0.061 0.088 0.016 0.051
n. SWFs 16 15 16 15
Adj. R2 0.03 0.04 -0.01 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
these variables are continuous variables we can use simple OLS to estimate these models.
As in the previous tables, we indicate for each sample the number of countries that have a
SWF.
The results indicate that the variables we identified as explanatory variables for the
SWFs, have in general much less, if any, explanatory power on the status of a country’s
financial position. The exception are GDP per capita and the current account, which con-
tribute significantly and positively to the net foreign asset position. If national savings,
as an economic policy, is a political decision, it might be expected that government con-
sumption, resource rents, as well as the government autocracy indicator would be strongly
related to these measures. We find no evidence for this in contrast to the models on SWF
establishment. Therefore, these results indicate that the emergence of SWFs is the result
of a very different process from balancing savings with respect to the rest of the world.
4.2. SWF characteristics
Our next step is to draw on additional information on the established SWFs to gain
some further understanding on the variation between funds. The limited number of exist-
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Figure 2: Predicted probabilities vs. SWF characteristics
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Note: Probabilities based on the model presented in Table 3 (5). Rectangles indicate pension
funds (shaded) and SWFs established before 1998 (blank), which were not included in the
regression as SWF countries. Y-axis variables come from Truman (2008).
ing or newly established funds precludes any informative and robust statistical analysis.
Nevertheless, it helps to look graphically to some of their characteristics in relation to the
results we found above.
Firstly, we calculated the predicted probability for the establishment of a SWF from
Table 3 model (5). Subsequently, we plotted this probability against the total size (meas-
ured by the total non-pension assets), fraction in foreign assets, ‘accountability/transparency’
(measuring “the accountability and transparency of the fund in its investment strategy, in-
vestment activities, reporting, and audits”) and ‘behaviour’ (measuring “behavior of the
fund in managing its portfolio and in the use of leverage and derivatives”, i.e. a measure
of sophistication of the investment activities) (Truman (2008, p.6)).24 We included in the
24These measures on institutional quality of funds do not come without their own limitations (Michener,
2015).
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plots all funds, including those established before 1998 as well as pension funds, allowing
the observation of difference between such funds with respect to recent resource-funded
SWFs.
The establishment of a SWF and its characteristics, such as its management, reporting
obligations and funding schedule are likely to be jointly decided. Since the predicted
probabilities of SWF establishment are a function of our independent variables, the charts
indicate how these predicted values correlate with some measures of SWF characteristics.
We see in the upper left plot that size (in terms of total non-pension assets) is not
related to the probability of the SWFs (ignoring the Singapore SWF, which actually has
no natural resource rents, there is no real pattern).25 This is interesting since the size
of resource rents by itself was found to be positively related to the probability of SWF
establishment. In general, countries with some of the largest rents have a fund that is
rather small. We then see in the upper right plot that the largest funds, outside the Gulf
countries, are dominated by Western countries and China. The portion of assets invested
abroad is 100% for most of the non-pension SWFs. Interestingly, Western funds, except
Norway, and China hold a significant fraction of their assets in domestic assets. For the
United States and Japan this makes sense as a global investment fund naturally includes a
sizeable fraction of their own economy, while for smaller countries a global fund would have
most assets abroad. However, this over-reliance could also indicate the lack of possibilities
to invest domestically, which might be a valid explanation for Russia, Kazakhstan, Trinidad
and Tobago, Iran and Venezuela. These countries might not be normally associated with
capital scarcity, but have difficulties in establishing private and public sector investment
opportunities.
With respect to the quality of these funds structure and behaviour there is an inter-
esting pattern as well to see in lower left and right plots. Countries with a high predicted
probability of a SWF tend to have decreasing scores on the measures of ‘accountabil-
ity/transparency’ and ‘behaviour’. Pension funds score generally higher on these ratings
than SWFs. It serves as a stark contrast that those countries that have the highest pre-
25Reproducing this plot in terms of assets/GDP does not improve the presentation nor changes the
pattern.
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Figure 3: Predicted probabilities for all countries vs. Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index in 2008 and
2016
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Note: Probabilities based on the model presented in Table 3 (5). Rectangles indic-
ate pension funds (shaded) and SWFs established before 1998 (blank), which were
not included in the regression as SWF countries. Y-axis reports Linaburg-Maduell
Transparency Index, as collected from http://wwww.swfinstitute.org.
diction have the lowest scores on their quality standards, relative to those countries that
have the lowest prediction but actually do have a fund.
As the ratings in Figure 2 come from a study published in 2008, we can loosely interpret
those for the new SWFs as the rating at establishment. The Linaburg-Maduell Transpar-
ency Index is issued quarterly since 2008 and, therefore, allows to see how these ratings
have changed over time and to what extent this pattern is related to our predictions. We
obtain similar results in Figure 3 when plotting the predicted probabilities on the x-axis
versus the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index, as measured in 2008. The general trend
towards 2016 of this rating is upward for countries that have below average ratings, sug-
gesting that with time all SWFs are converging towards best practices, although some
funds keep scoring very low ratings.
Finally, it is interesting to include all countries including those that that never estab-
lished a SWF. Figure 4 can reveal the false positives, as well as correct negatives. On the
“false positives” side, say above 40%, we have Turkmenistan (TKM), Indonesia (IDN),
Guinea Bissau (GNB) and Switzerland (CHE).26
On the side of correct negatives we have Angola (AGO), Republic of Congo (COG) and
26While Indonesia has relatively high rents from oil and gas, much of the royalties towards the government
are held by the districts and provinces where the extraction takes place, where local governments use the
proceeds for local spending (Cust and Rusli, 2014).
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Figure 4: Predicted probabilities for all countries
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Note: Circles indicate existing funds, both established before and after 1998. Here
we compare “false positives’ with “correct negatives” and “correct positives”.
Equatorial Guinea (GNQ) with sizeable resource rents but no SWF, while the predicted
probability is also low.27 The score for Angola is low because the resource rent impact is
cancelled out by its non-democratic structure. It scores below average on the education,
spending around 2.5% of GDP. A similar explanation holds for Congo, which on top of
that has a lower income per capita measure.
4.3. Political channels
Table 7 looks further into the channels of the political regime determinants. In the
discussion on the hypotheses in Section 2, we indicated that political accountability and
well defined property rights are important determinants for policy decisions on managing
resource revenue. PolityIV has measures that indicate competition both for the executive
and for political parties. Political competition, for instance through term limits of office
and electoral processes, implies that politicians can be held accountable for their decisions.
The results in Table 7 are consistent with this channel. The higher the measure of
27Angola actually has set up a SWF in 2012, so fell out of our estimation sample of 1998-2008.
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Table 7: Political Channels
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Polity var Autocrat xrreg xrcomp parcomp
SWF SWF SWF SWF
Rents (%GDP) 0.218*** -0.207** -0.034 -0.188*
(0.051) (0.084) (0.040) (0.110)
Log GDPpc 1.437*** 1.975*** 1.919*** 2.196***
(0.297) (0.428) (0.409) (0.494)
Polity var 3.878*** -5.128*** -2.510*** -2.108***
(1.046) (1.313) (0.516) (0.482)
Polity var × Rents -0.206*** 0.127*** 0.066*** 0.107**
(0.058) (0.044) (0.023) (0.047)
Gov. cons. -0.221*** -0.182*** -0.238*** -0.242***
(0.073) (0.061) (0.073) (0.068)
Constant -13.084*** -4.181** -10.256*** -10.595***
(2.603) (2.056) (2.376) (2.499)
Observations 163 128 128 128
n. SWFs 16 16 16 16
Pseudo R2 0.30 0.42 0.40 0.40
ll -36.80 -28.01 -28.84 -28.79
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The polity variables indicated at the top of each model are: (2) xrreg:
regulation of chief executive recruitment, (3) xrcomp: competitiveness
of executive recruitment, (4) parcomp: the competitiveness of particip-
ation. See Marshall et al. (2006) for details.
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executive regulation (xrreg), executive competition (xrcomp), and political competition
(parcomp), the less likely a country is to establish a fund. The same interaction with rents
found before holds here as well. A higher value of rents, will decrease the effect of rents on
the decision to establish a fund.28
5. Discussion
In summary, we find that countries are more likely to set up a SWF if they have natural
resources or are autocratic, while the opportunity for domestic investments make them
less likely to do so. Secondly, we find no evidence that the same drivers affect countries’
asset position. Thirdly, the probability of establishing a fund correlates negatively with
transparency and governance quality indicators. Fourthly, there is a strong political channel
related to the SWF, indicating that autocratic countries, particularly through indicators
of accountability and protection of private property rights, are more likely to establish a
SWF.
In combination, we view these findings as suggestive evidence that many established
SWF were not established from a public benefit point of view. However, we cannot say,
with the evidence that we have collected, that SWFs were on average good or bad for a
country. We concentrated on the determinants of SWF establishments, not their effects
on, or use in, domestic policy making.
Comparing Chile’s with Peru’s experience of natural resource wealth management, Ori-
huela (2013) highlights that different historical experiences and geographical aspects, as
well as other country and time specific circumstances, all contribute to the way govern-
ments and experts, such as local economists, were able and prepared to think about policy
on natural resource wealth management. While our results can indicate that on average
SWFs are established while taking past economic circumstances into account, their char-
acter, in terms of transparency and behaviour, were, at least initially, more reflective of
countries’ existing institutions.
28This naturally does not suggest that this is the only mechanism of a country’s institution that interact
with SWF established. In fact we found that many, but not all, of the institutional variables of PolityIV
interact in our setup. Results available on request.
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That the characteristics of SWFs reflect domestic institutions, which in turn may or
may not have been affected by natural resources, relates to other studies looking to model
the interaction of natural resources, institutional quality and public capital investments
(Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Gylfason and Zoega, 2006; Cabrales and Hauk, 2011),
or the level of democracy (e.g. Ross, 2001; Haber and Menaldo, 2011). Torvik (2016)
considers theoretically how the choice between domestic investments and savings through
a fund are related to existing institutions (e.g. quality of government and rent-seeking
behaviour) and may in turn reinforce each other. One simplification of this model is that a
fund will always stimulate rent seeking, while domestic investment in ’non-lootable’ capital,
such as education, breeds good future institutions. The reality is of course not as simple,
domestic investment projects might very well be wasted into ‘white elephants’ (Robinson
and Torvik, 2005), while well managed and accountable funds, following international
auditing standards, may not be necessarily detrimental to political institutions.
Furthermore, institutions are not fixed in time, and neither are the characteristics of
the SWFs included in our sample. As Figure 3 demonstrates, there appears a general
improvement of standards among SWFs. This stands in contrast to the example given
in Torvik (2016) of Chad, looting its World Bank supported SWF for military purposes.
Continuous monitoring and technical assistance by NGOs and multilateral organisations
remain key requirements, especially when the initial country’s institutions are not sufficient
to guarantee the optimal use of the funds under management.
6. Conclusion
We presented evidence on the determinants for the establishment of Sovereign Wealth
Funds. Based on recent literature on optimal policies for savings and investments of re-
source rich-countries, we hypothesised the role of the key variables. We find that both
economic and political aspects play an important role and interact.
Our results suggest that SWFs from non-democratic regimes are probably not estab-
lished to be politically active in foreign countries. Instead, their emergence points to defects
at origin: the inability, or unwillingness to direct the funds towards improving the domestic
economy. Discussions should, therefore, continue on why SWFs hold most of their funds
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in foreign investments, while improving the domestic investment climate may reap much
higher benefits.29
Our results on fund establishments are in line with the literature that debates the
different strategies of harnessing resource windfalls given the choice between international
investments and domestic investment opportunities. Domestic characteristics are a strong
determinant of SWFs establishments. A trade-off between economic and rivalrous rent-
seeking is also confirmed. This suggests again that the resource rents are currently not
always used for the benefit of the development of the country.
Looking at the qualitative ratings attributed to SWFs over the years, we found that
countries that have particularly large resource rents to manage typically have established
small and operationally opaque SWF. However, these ratings have improved over time
suggesting that the potential for SWF to be used for a countries general welfare appears
to have increased. This is relevant for the future. Even if our results suggest that initially
SWFs are established as substitutes to good domestic economic policy, the improvements
in institutional quality, if indeed accurately measured, may allow them to become vital
instruments for economic development.
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AppendixA. SWFs Overview and Data sources
Table A-1: Assets (in billion US$) and inception of the 50 largest SWFs, as of September 2016
Ranking Country SWF Assets Year LMTI 1998-2008
1 Norway Government Pension Fund - Global 885 1990 10 0
2 China China Investment Corporation 813.8 2007 8 1
3 UAE - Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 792 1976 6 0
4 Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings 598.4 n/a 4 0
5 Kuwait Kuwait Investment authority 592 1953 6 0
6 China SAFE Investment company 474 1997 4 0
7 Hong-Kong HK Monetary Authority 442.4 1993 8 0
8 Singapore Government of Singapore Investment corporation 350 1981 6 0
9 Qatar Qatar Investment Authority 335 2005 5 1
10 China National Social Security Fund 236 2000 5 1
11 UAE- Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubai 196 2006 5 1
12 Singapore Temasek Holdings 193.6 1974 10 0
13 Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund 160 2008 4 1
14 UAE - Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Council 110 2007 n/a 1
15 Australia Australian Future Fund 95 2006 10 1
16 South Korea Korean Investment Corporation 91.8 2005 9 1
17 Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund 77 2000 2 1
18 Russia National Welfare Fund 73.5 2008 5 1
19 Kazakhstan Samruk-Kazyna JSC 69.3 2008 10 1
20 UAE - Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Investment Company 66.3 1984 9 0
21 UAE - Abu Dhabi Mubadala Development Company 66.3 2002 10 1
22 Libya Libyan Investment Authority 66 2006 1 1
23 Russia Reserve Fund 65.7 2008 5 1
24 Iran National Development Fund of Iran 62 2011 5 0
25 US - Alaska Alaska Permanent Fund 53.9 1976 10 0
26 Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund 50 2000 1 1
27 Brunei Brunei Investment Agency 40 1983 1 0
28 US - Texas Texas Permanent School Fund 37.7 1854 9 0
29 Azerbaijan State Oil Fund 37.3 1999 10 1
30 Malaysia Khasanah Nasional 34.9 1993 9 0
31 Oman State General Reserve Fund 34 2006 4 1
32 Ireland Ireland Strategic Investment fund 23.5 2001 10 1
33 New Zealand NZ Superannuation Fund 20.2 2003 10 1
34 US - New Mexico New Mexico State Investment Council 19.8 1958 9 0
35 Canada Alberta’s Heritage Fund 17.5 1976 9 0
36 US - Texas Permanent University Fund 17.2 1876 n/a 0
37 East Timor Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund 16.9 2005 8 1
38 Chile Social and Economic Stabilization Fund 15.2 2007 10 1
39 UAE - Federal Emirates Investment Authority 15 2007 3 1
40 Russia Russian Direct Investment Fund 13 2011 n/a 0
41 Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company 10.6 2006 10 1
42 Peru Fiscal stabilization Fund 9.2 1999 n/a 1
43 Chile Pension Reserve Fund 7.9 2006 10 1
44 Mexico Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund of Mexico 6 2000 4 1
45 Oman Oman Investment Fund 6 2006 4 1
46 Botswana Pula Fund 5.7 1994 6 0
47 US - Wyoming Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust Fund 5.6 1974 9 0
48 Trinidad and Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund 5.5 2000 8 1
49 China China-africa Development Fund 5 2007 5 1
50 Angola Fundo Soberano de Angola 5 2012 8 0
TOTAL 7, 423 29
Notes: LMTI stands for Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index. This information about the 50 largest Sovereign Wealth
Funds is compiled from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, with most recent assets data at date of collection http:
//www.swfinstitute.org (accessed on December 5, 2016).
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Table A-2: Data Description
Variable Description Source
SWF Country dummy equal to 1 if the country established
his first SWF in the 1998-2008 period, to 0 otherwise
Truman (2008) and
www.swfinstitute.org
Rents Total Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP) WB WDI (ny.gdp.totl.rt.zs)
Log GDPpc log GDP per Capita, constant US$, millions WB indicators (GDPPCKD)
Non-democrat. Country dummy equal to 1 if polity2 is smaller or equal
to 0, to 0 otherwise
Polity IV Project
Edu. exp. Public spending on education, total (% of GDP) WB WDI (se.xpd.totl.gd.zs)
road/pop Road Density - Population (road-km/1000 people) WB WDI INFVP calculations
Gov. cons. General government final consumption expenditure (%
of GDP)
WB WDI (ne.con.govt.zs)
Curr. acc. Current Account Balance, %GDP WB indicators (bncabfundcd)
Debt Sovereign debt (% of GDP) Abbas et al. (2010)
NFA Net Financial Assets, excluding gold (% of GDP) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) as up-
dated/extended
FXRes Foreign Exchange reserves, excluding gold (% of GDP) Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) as up-
dated/extended
σ2(GDP ) Coefficient of variation of GDP over 1978-1998 WB WDI (ny.gdp.mktp.cd)
σ2(Rents) Coefficient of variation of Rents over 1978-1998 WB WDI (ny.gdp.totl.rt.zs)
Gini GINI index WB WDI (si.pov.gini)
Log GDPpc/(100-Gini) logarithm of GDP per capita as divided by (100-Gini) WB WDI (si.pov.gini and GDPPCKD)
Natural gas rents Natural gas rents (% of GDP) WB WDI (ny.gdp.ngas.rt.zs)
Oil rents Oil rents (% of GDP) WB WDI (ny.gdp.petr.rt.zs)
Commodity Exp. Primary commodities (% total exports) over 1995-
1998
UNCTADstat (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 +
4 + 68)
xrreg regulation of chief executive recruitment Polity IV Project
xrcomp competitiveness of executive recruitment Polity IV Project
parcomp the competitiveness of participation Polity IV Project
Note. The regressions are performed on 5-year averages (1994-1998) of the explanatory variables (Rents, Log GDPpc,
Edu. exp., road/pop, Gov. cons., Curr. acc., Debt, NFA, FXRes, Gini, Log GDPpc/(100-Gini), Natural gas rents,
Oil rents). Since UNCTAD data are only available from 1995, Commodity Exp. is a 4-year average (1995-1998).
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AppendixB. Supplementary Appendix
AppendixB.1. Role of income inequality
We may suspect that income per capita will not capture to what extent this income
is spread over the entire population, whereas oil rents are often concentrated towards an
elite. Hence, we may suspect that in societies where income or wealth is more unequally
distributed are more likely to set up a SWF as the elite will make this decision for themselves
rather than for the people. Table B-1 shows that inequality –as measured by the GINI-
coefficient– seems to play a marginal role.
Table B-1: Alternative regressors based on Gini Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SWF SWF SWF SWF
Rents (%GDP) 0.436*** 0.433*** 0.434*** 0.418***
(0.161) (0.153) (0.153) (0.140)
Log GDPpc 5.064*** 5.349*** 5.327***
(1.861) (1.872) (1.878)
Non-democrat 1.001 1.380 1.308 1.392
(1.582) (1.547) (1.539) (1.485)
Non-democrat × Rents 0.267** 0.308** 0.306** 0.358**
(0.135) (0.145) (0.148) (0.160)
Gov. cons. -0.429*** -0.419*** -0.424*** -0.410**
(0.158) (0.154) (0.157) (0.178)
Gini index 0.050
(0.051)
log(100-Gini) -2.406
(2.915)
log Gini-corrected GDPpc 5.381***
(1.910)
Constant -41.030*** -45.962*** -33.818* -22.716***
(15.707) (16.436) (17.304) (8.501)
Observations 60 60 60 60
n. SWFs 10 10 10 10
Pseudo R2 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.62
ll -10.12 -9.96 -10.00 -10.24
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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AppendixB.2. Alternative resource rent proxies
We present some alternatives in the measures of the rents in Table B-2. The World
Bank provides figures for oil and gas separately. We find that the mechanism holds for
both types of rents, but is stronger for natural gas. The sample size is greatly reduced for
this measure, nonetheless the estimates are very much in line with the main results.
Additionally, we created our own resource wealth measure based on trade statistics,
which measures the percentage of primary commodities in total trade. One drawback of
the rents measure is that it does not capture whether the resource is used for domestic
consumption or mostly exported, while SWFs are often related to exported commodities.
We find that the export measure offers consistent results. While not significant at the
conventional levels, the coefficients on the resource measure and interaction with political
regime indicate the same process. Nevertheless, the impact of commodity exports is dis-
tinctively smaller, and coefficient on the interaction with regime type does not indicate the
same relation as we find for the resource rents given that it distinctively smaller still (in
absolute value) relative to the direct export variable.
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Table B-2: Alternative resource measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SWF SWF SWF SWF SWF SWF
Natural Gas Rents 1.971*** 2.477***
(0.701) (0.621)
Oil Rents 0.329*** 0.344***
(0.086) (0.094)
Commodity Ex. 0.041** 0.042**
(0.019) (0.019)
Log GDPpc 0.607*** 1.180*** 0.783*** 1.218*** 1.009*** 1.324***
(0.197) (0.321) (0.222) (0.316) (0.252) (0.269)
Non-democrat 2.540*** 3.483*** 2.837*** 3.206*** 3.158 4.384**
(0.770) (0.903) (0.915) (0.967) (2.161) (2.222)
Non-dem × Gas rents -2.001*** -2.543***
(0.704) (0.630)
Non-dem × Oil rents -0.309*** -0.303***
(0.091) (0.102)
Non-dem × Com. Exp. -0.025 -0.036
(0.028) (0.029)
Gov. cons. -0.284*** -0.226*** -0.194***
(0.077) (0.087) (0.070)
Constant -8.181*** -9.344*** -10.095*** -10.638*** -13.398*** -13.377***
(1.991) (2.478) (2.329) (2.500) (3.205) (3.019)
Observations 126 123 128 125 149 140
n. SWFs 16 16 16 16 15 15
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.32 0.23 0.32 0.18 0.24
ll -39.10 -32.14 -36.90 -32.30 -39.98 -36.02
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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AppendixB.3. model specification and sample selection
Table B-3 and B-4 present results on the model specifications. Table B-3 does this
through inclusion of squared terms of the independent variables Log GDPpc, education
and goverment consumption. Table B-4 through the variation of the interaction component
with rents. Generally the result are in line with what we presented in the main text. In
particular, it further suggests that the interaction of rents with the democracy indicator
robust and not driven by other factors.
Table B-3: Additional results to Table 3 - forms of log GDPpc and Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SWF SWF SWF SWF
Rents (%GDP) 0.250*** 0.236*** 0.312*** 0.259***
(0.084) (0.083) (0.088) (0.079)
Log GDPpc 1.232*** 13.936** 1.954*** 1.302***
(0.418) (6.189) (0.565) (0.430)
(Log GDPpc)2 -0.716**
(0.325)
Non-democrat 2.822* 3.953* 4.828** 2.731*
(1.603) (2.318) (2.190) (1.618)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.204** -0.205** -0.225 -0.205**
(0.097) (0.099) (0.214) (0.096)
Edu. exp. -0.592* -0.620 8.328** -0.561
(0.355) (0.543) (4.209) (0.368)
Gov. exp. excl. edu. -0.239* -0.220 -0.547* 0.747
(0.124) (0.137) (0.296) (0.595)
(Edu. exp.)2 -1.385**
(0.608)
(Gov. exp. excl. edu.)2 -0.056
(0.038)
Constant -9.525*** -65.222** -26.711*** -14.197***
(3.469) (28.633) (8.064) (4.524)
Observations 99 99 99 99
n. SWFs 10 10 10 10
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.39 0.47 0.34
ll -22.16 -19.65 -17.09 -21.41
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In Table B-5 we present further results on the affect of national debt in our model. In
the main text we concluded that debt has an statistically insignificant effect. We show here
that the effect of debt appears to be sensitive to sample selection. When restricting the
sample to the same countries for which we government consumption and education data,
the effect of debt is statistically significant and the sign intuitive: higher debt dissuades
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Table B-4: Additional results to Table 3, interaction with rents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interaction variable Rents Log GDPpc Non-democrat Gov. cons.
SWF SWF SWF SWF
Rents (%GDP) 0.260** -1.552** 0.202*** -0.059
(0.118) (0.702) (0.051) (0.051)
Log GDPpc 1.170*** 0.311 1.187*** 1.019***
(0.312) (0.256) (0.261) (0.248)
Non-democrat 1.803** 1.862*** 3.294*** 2.008**
(0.701) (0.651) (0.992) (0.913)
interaction var. × Rents -0.004* 0.214** -0.165*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.094) (0.059) (0.002)
Gov. cons. -0.057 -0.087 -0.093 -0.237***
(0.088) (0.072) (0.093) (0.079)
Constant -12.877*** -4.628** -12.572*** -8.243***
(3.468) (1.886) (2.395) (1.914)
Observations 163 163 163 163
n. SWFs 17 17 17 17
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.35 0.25 0.25
ll -41.14 -35.69 -41.05 -41.15
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
from the decision of setting up a savings fund, suggesting that paying off external debt is
prioritised.
In table B-6 we present the benchmark results over a constant (minimal) sample. Size
and standard errors are little effected. In figure B-1 we present an alternative test on
sample selection by plotting the main coefficients and standard errors while sequentially
leaving one country out. The results are generally stable, while the occasional peaks are
predominantly away from zero.
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Table B-5: Additional results to Table 5, Debt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SWF SWF SWF SWF
Rents (%GDP) 0.205*** 0.264*** 0.501*** 0.442**
(0.072) (0.071) (0.182) (0.187)
Log GDPpc 0.841*** 1.262*** 0.844 0.626
(0.234) (0.334) (0.562) (0.509)
Non-democrat 2.733*** 3.497*** 1.473 1.713
(1.017) (1.114) (1.710) (1.568)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.168** -0.233*** -0.269 -0.260
(0.077) (0.075) (0.202) (0.191)
Gov. exp. excl. edu. -0.294***
(0.091)
Edu. exp. -0.284***
(0.110)
Debt (% GDP) -0.013 -0.012 -0.076*** -0.061***
(0.014) (0.010) (0.025) (0.017)
Gov. cons. -0.232***
(0.087)
Constant -10.001*** -10.553*** -4.286 -6.771
(2.616) (2.748) (5.133) (4.913)
Observations 144 138 88 88
n. SWFs 15 15 9 9
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.31 0.53 0.43
ll -37.90 -32.93 -13.57 -16.61
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B-6: Robustness check - constant sample size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SWF SWF SWF SWF SWF SWF
Rents (%GDP) 0.250*** 0.222** 0.243*** 0.262** 0.230** 0.089
(0.084) (0.091) (0.077) (0.107) (0.096) (0.073)
Log GDPpc 1.232*** 0.741*** 1.132*** 1.187*** 0.713** 0.403
(0.418) (0.276) (0.362) (0.439) (0.286) (0.259)
Non-democrat 2.822* 2.104 2.699** 2.729 2.283* 0.278
(1.603) (1.355) (1.343) (1.683) (1.295) (1.114)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.204** -0.204** -0.207** -0.216* -0.213**
(0.097) (0.102) (0.095) (0.115) (0.104)
Edu. exp. -0.592* -0.776***
(0.355) (0.271)
Gov. exp. excl. edu. -0.239* -0.057
(0.124) (0.047)
Gov. cons. -0.310***
(0.093)
Constant -9.525*** -9.090*** -8.940*** -10.885*** -9.528*** -6.088**
(3.469) (2.985) (2.949) (3.930) (3.017) (2.540)
Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99
n. SWFs 10 10 10 10 10 10
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.19 0.30 0.26 0.16 0.08
ll -22.16 -26.38 -22.54 -24.03 -27.06 -29.88
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure B-1: Robustness check - sensibility to country exclusion
1
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
16
3
.15 .2 .25 .3
Rents \%GDP
1 1.5 2
Log GDPpc
2 4 6
Non-d.
-.3 -.2 -.1
RxNon-d
-.3 -.2 -.1
Edu. exp.
Note: graphs indicate coefficient on the regressors whilst excluding one observation per estim-
ation, shaded area is 95% confidence interval. The variables refer to the five regressors in the
benchmark model, non-democrat is the dummy, ”rent nond” is the interaction of non-democracy
with rents, ”ne con gov zs” is Government consumption. .
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AppendixB.4. Duration analysis
Our data also allows us to do duration analysis, where we model the distribution of the
time it takes to set up a SWF. Technically, we interpret our data as a stock sample with
right censoring, since we take all countries that have no SWF in 1997, as the start of the
spell, while not all countries will set up a SWF at the time our time period of analysis ends.
For this reason duration models are interesting in our case since the feature of censoring
allows us to take into account those countries without a SWF. We will present here just
standard (parametric) duration models that fall in the proportional hazard class. The
proportional hazard models imply that our covariates of interest are limited in shifting the
hazard function (interpretable as the probability of failure at date t, given survival up to
t − 1) up or down over the entire time scale (i.e. the proportional effect of covariates do
not change over time).
We report in Table B-7 different specifications based on Cox and Weibull models. The
effect on the hazard function can be found by taking exp(β) − 1. Positive coefficients
shift the hazard function upwards, indicating an increased probability of setting up a SWF
relative to the baseline. The benchmark Cox and Weibull models are reported in columns
(1) and (2) and lead to conclusions similar to those obtained in the benchmark table with
a positive impact of funding (GDP per capita and resource rents are significant) and of
autocracy, an interaction term between autocracy and resource rents that indicate that
resources no longer matter in an autocratic country and a negative impact of government
expenses (same results for education expenses - not reported in the Table). For the sake
of comparability with previous tables, the last column restricts the data on SWFs to the
1998-2008 periods, which keeps results unchanged, but increases slightly the estimates for
the unconditional trend, suggesting that more and more SWFs are likely to be observed as
time passes. However, comparing αˆ among the different models, indicates that the rate of
SWF establishments is neither increasing nor decreasing with time (none of the estimated
parameters is significantly different from 1).
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Table B-7: Duration analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cox Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull
Full Full Full Democrat Autocrat Short sample
Rents (%GDP) 0.177*** 0.182*** 0.195*** 0.081** 0.037** 0.181***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.051) (0.035) (0.017) (0.044)
Log GDPpc 1.203*** 1.232*** 1.167*** 1.034*** 1.161*** 1.221***
(0.239) (0.238) (0.314) (0.287) (0.310) (0.238)
Non-democrat 2.669*** 2.794*** 2.391** 2.727***
(0.719) (0.730) (1.156) (0.717)
Non-democrat × Rents -0.143*** -0.150*** -0.147***
(0.045) (0.070) (0.045)
Gov. cons. -0.095* -0.094* -0.151* -0.057 -0.098*
(0.050) (0.049) (0.078) (0.054) (0.050)
Edu. exp. -0.203
(0.146)
Gov. exp. ex. edu -0.163**
(0.075)
Constant -15.087*** -12.923*** -12.098*** -12.208*** -15.246***
(2.367) (3.170) (2.749) (2.634) (2.347)
Observations 167 167 103 120 47 167
ll -89.97 -71.75 -48.06 -41.93 -29.62 -66.43
αˆ 0.947 0.881 0.925 0.953 1.120
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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